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The Double-Helix Double-Edged
Sword: Comparing DNA Retention
Policies of the United States and
the United Kingdom
ABSTRACT

Forensicscientists have used DNA profiling technologies to
link suspects to crimes since Alec Jeffreys first proposed the idea
in the 1970s. Recognizing the potential for using DNA
databases to solve crimes and to prevent future crimes, England
and Wales attempted to greatly expand its DNA database by
allowing for the collection and indefinite retention of DNA
profiles from arrestees. The European Court of Human Rights,
however, issued a ruling in 2008 in the case of S. & Marper v.
United Kingdom, advising the United Kingdom to restrict use of
DNA profiles from arrestees and to establish time frames for
removal of this information from databases. Conversely, in the
United States, federal and state legislation have become
increasingly expansive and many states and the federal
government now allow for collection of DNA samples from
arrestees. This Note considers the evolving United States laws
governing DNA databases in light of the Marper decision and
proposes placing limits on the ability of law enforcement to use
and retain DNA profiles from arrestees.
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CONCLUSION

It is impossible for a criminal to act, especially considering the
intensity of a crime, without leaving traces of his presence.
-Edmond Locardl

I.

INTRODUCTION

Criminal investigations have increasingly come to rely on the use
of technology and scientific advancements to identify suspects and
solve crimes.2 At the center of this movement is the use of DNA
profiling to link suspects with crimes and to exonerate convicted
individuals by excluding them as possible sources of DNA collected
from crime scenes.3 DNA collection from individuals in the criminal
context occurs under essentially one of four possible policies: (1)
collection of DNA only from individuals who are charged and
convicted of crimes; (2) DNA collection from arrestees with indefinite
retention of DNA profiles on a database; (3) DNA collection from
arrestees with removal of DNA profiles upon request; and (4) DNA
collection from arrestees with automatic expungement.
England is at the forefront of the movement to use DNA to solve
crimes, and the England and Wales National DNA Database is the
largest forensic database in the world.4 Recognizing the potential for
using DNA to solve crimes and to prevent future crimes, England
attempted to greatly expand its DNA database by allowing for the

LEROY LAD PANEK, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN DETECTIVE STORY 168
1.
(translating EDMOND LOCARD, MANUEL DE TECHNIQUE POLICIERE (1923)).
2.
See LAWRENCE KOBILINSKY ET AL., DNA: FORENSIC AND LEGAL
APPLICATIONS 1-7 (2005) (describing the "evolution of identification" in criminal
investigations).
Id. at 5-7.
3.
Rowena E. Rodrigues, Big Bio-Brother Is Here: Wanting, Taking and
4.
Keeping Your DNA 2 (British & Irish Law, Educ. & Tech. Ass'n, 2007),
http://www.bileta.ac.uk/Document%20Library/1/Big%2OBio-Brother%20is%20here%20%20wanting,%20taking%20and%20keeping%20your%20DNA.pdf.
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collection and indefinite retention of DNA profiles from arrestees. 5
Collecting and retaining DNA from individuals who were not
convicted of a crime raises concerns about the privacy interests of the
individual versus possible benefits to society. 6 Similar concerns are
present when legislation allows for the indefinite retention of samples
Even Alec Jeffreys, whose discoveries
from convicted persons.
revolutionized the use of DNA in criminal cases, expressed concern
about the selective expansion of DNA databases. 7 He commented
that retaining suspects' DNA is "likely to be discriminatory; it won't
affect people at random but be skewed in favour of certain
socioeconomic and ethnic groups."
The United States has begun to move toward a system similar to
that present in the United Kingdom prior to the S. & Marper
decision. Federal legislation now allows for the collection of DNA
samples from arrestees.9 Additionally, a number of states have
passed similar legislation, and both state and federal courts have
ruled that these laws are constitutional.
This Note examines the implications of the emerging trend in the
United States toward looser restrictions on DNA retention and
collection, and proposes that federal and state legislatures act now to
prevent future abuses in the use of expanded DNA databases. Part II
provides an overview of the use of forensic DNA analysis and the
ways in which the technology has developed to facilitate law
enforcement's efforts to solve both new and previously unsolved
crimes. It then examines the current system in the United Kingdom
and evolving trends in United States DNA collection and retention.
Part III compares the DNA profiling system in the United Kingdom
following the Marper decision with the current system in the United
States. It also analyzes the potential risks that are present if the
United States continues with its current trend toward permitting
collection and retention of DNA from arrestees. Part IV proposes to
restrict the ability of law enforcement to retain DNA profiles collected
from arrestees. It further establishes guidelines barring the use of
forensic technology to conduct familial searches on DNA profiles,
unless permission has been given by the source of the original profile
or in certain exceptional circumstances.

45-47.
5.
S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1581,
6
See infra Part III.A (discussing the privacy interests of individuals from
whom DNA may be collected).
7.
See Frances Gibb, The DNA Scientist Who Made Individuals of Us All, Times,
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article745719.ece
Dec.
6,
2005,
(discussing Jeffreys's concerns that retaining suspects' DNA may affect certain
socioeconomic and ethnic groups more than others and may inappropriately disclose
information about familial relationships).
Id.
8.
See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing federal legislation
9.
governing DNA collection).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of DNA Technology
Physical evidence has long helped law enforcement to solve
crimes.10 Given the unreliability, and sometimes unavailability, of
eyewitnesses, physical evidence may be the only means of solving a
crime.1' Physical evidence can range from something as seemingly
simple as a shoeprint1 2 to something as complex as DNA. The use of
fingerprints and blood typing was a precursor to DNA sampling,' 3
and law enforcement began classifying, storing, and retrieving
fingerprint data using computers in the early 1970s.14 Fingerprints
are often said to provide "absolute proof of identity," because they
remain the same throughout a person's lifetime and are unique to
each individual.' 5 DNA profiling has now emerged as a method of
identifying the source of biological evidence that rivals fingerprint
analysis in reliability and effectiveness.16
In the early 1980s, two fifteen-year-old girls were raped and
murdered in a village in England.' 7 The crimes occurred three years
apart, but no arrest could be made until after the second murder.' 8
Despite receiving a confession from one man for the second crime, law
enforcement was able to use DNA forensic techniques to determine
that the same man had murdered both girls, and it was not the man
who had confessed.' 9 In making this discovery, police received
cooperation from approximately five thousand local men who
volunteered to have DNA samples collected and tested.20 Colin

10.
See KOBILINSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 1-7 (describing different types of
physical evidence and their use in criminal investigations).
11.
Id. at 1.
12.
See id. at 1-2 (describing how crime scene investigators utilize shoe prints
as evidence).
13.
See Frederick R. Bieber, Science and Technology of Forensic DNA Profiling:
Current Use and Future Directions, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE
TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 23, 24-25 (David Lazer ed., 2004) (discussing the origins of
forensic identity testing, including the use of fingerprint ridge pattern analysis and
identification of heritable variations in human blood types).
KOBILINSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 5.
14.
15.
Id. at 3-4.
16.

Id.

at 5; see also MALCOLM

DAVIES ET AL.,

CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN

INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES 97 (1995)
("The use of DNA profiling was also regarded as reliable as fingerprinting to check the
unique characteristics of an individual.").
17.
Gibb, supra note 7.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
20.
Id.
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Pitchfork eventually came forward and police were able to match his
DNA to both crimes in the first successful use of such technology. 21
DNA is the genetic material that is partially responsible for
transmitting individual characteristics from parents to offspring. 22
In the mid-1970s, laboratory methods were developed to detect
genetic variation at the DNA level.2 3 While some portions of DNA do
not differ between individuals, 24 there is enough variation in 2
percent of the genome to make DNA sequencing and the creation of
DNA profiles useful in forensic analysis.25 Different methods were
developed and utilized for forensic DNA analysis,26 but the need to
have DNA that is of both sufficient quality and quantity continues to
limit their use.27 Some advances, such as the polymerase chain
reaction (PCR) DNA typing procedure, now allow criminalists to
replicate DNA, thereby expanding its usability. 28 In order for DNA
evidence to be useful, it remains particularly important to maintain
the integrity of the DNA samples collected.2 9 Problems that can arise
during the analysis procedure include contamination, degradation,
interference from environmental conditions, the presence of
inhibitors, and human error.3 0
DNA profiles extracted from the evidence are then compared to
DNA found in blood or tissue taken from known samples, and one of
these interpretations usually applies: inclusion, exclusion, or
inconclusive. 31 A finding of inclusion indicates that there was a
match between a known sample and the evidentiary sample.32 If an
interpretation of DNA inclusion is made, testifying experts must
provide fact-finders, such as jurors, with estimates of the likelihood of
finding the particular DNA profile in a randomly selected individual
and with statistics about how rare the profile is in the relevant

21.

Id.; see also Gary Cordner & Kathryn E. Scarborough, The Myth that

Science Solves Crimes, in DEMYSTIFYING CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 104, 107-08

(Robert M. Bohm & Jeffery T. Walker eds., 2006) (describing the use of DNA by law
enforcement in the United States and the United Kingdom).
Bieber, supra note 13, at 25.
22.
23.
Id.
24.

KOBILINSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 6.

25.
Bieber, supra note 13, at 26.
26.
See id. at 28-34 (discussing laboratory procedures, including the use of the
polymerase chain reaction).
See KOBILINSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 19 ("Thus, insufficient quantity and
27.
poor quality of the sample often limited the ability to obtain useful identifying
information.").
28.
Id. at 19, 71.
See id. at 28-34 (describing procedures for packaging and preserving
29.
biological evidence found at a crime scene).
30.
See id. at 129-34 (describing further how these factors can interfere with
the analysis of biological evidence).
31.
Bieber, supra note 13, at 34-35.
32.
Id. at 35.
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population.3 3 In the United States, the major population groups
include Caucasians, Blacks, West Coast Hispanics, East Coast
Hispanics, and Asians.34
Previously, prosecutors and laboratories had to be cognizant of
the fact that findings were of little or no statistical significance if the
database size was too small.35 As the technology has evolved and
databases have increased in size, however, juries are often told that a
particular "genetic profile is as rare as one in a trillion .

.

. [and] is

With jurors becoming
essentially an absolute identification."36
increasingly confident in and reliant upon these DNA testing results,
laboratories must exercise proper quality control and quality
assurance procedures to avoid the potentially tragic consequences of a
false exclusion or inclusion.37
B. The United Kingdom
1.

History of Forensics in the United Kingdom

Britain was the first country to have a national DNA database.38
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice39 recommended the
establishment of the DNA database in 1993,40 and the Home Office
officially announced its creation a year later. 41 At that time, the
Home Office also commissioned a pilot study to examine the use of
DNA in the context of a forensic database. 42 In 1995, the Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act (CJPOA) mandated establishment of the
England and Wales National DNA Database (NDNAD), and it has
since become the largest forensic database in the world. 4 3 The
NDNAD is maintained by the Forensic Science Service (FSS) in
Birmingham. 44 The FSS, a quasi-governmental agency, also performs
45
90 percent of England's forensic DNA analysis.

KOBILINSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 149; Bieber, supranote 12, at 35-36.
33.
KOBILINSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 149-50.
34.
Id. at 126.
35.
36.
Id. at 157.
See id. ("Failure to perform the DNA tests properly could lead to false
37.
exclusions as well as false inclusions, sometimes with tragic consequences.").
DAVIES ET AL., supra note 16, at 97.
38.
The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice was established in 1991 in
39.
response to concerns about public confidence in the criminal justice system.
CHRISTOPHER H. ASPLEN, THE APPLICATION OF DNA TECHNOLOGY IN ENGLAND AND

WALES 4 (2004), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/203971.pdf.
Id.
40.
DAVIES ET AL., supra note 16, at 97.
41.
ASPLEN, supranote 39, at 5.
42.
43.
Rodrigues, supra note 4, at 2.
44.

GRAEME

LAURIE, GENETIC PRIVACY: A CHALLENGE TO MEDICO-LEGAL

NORMS 91 n.29 (2002); see also Circular 16/95 from Peter Wrench, Head, Policing
Organised Crime Unit, to the Chief Officer of Police of England and Wales (Mar. 31,
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Prior to enactment of the CJPOA, collection of evidence from
suspects was permitted pursuant to the 1984 Police and Criminal
Evidence Act (PACE), 46 which required a "serious arrestable
offence" 4 7 and only allowed police to collect fingerprints.4 8
Additionally, an officer could only take fingerprints without consent
in the following circumstances: if an officer of at least the rank of
superintendent authorized the taking, if the person was charged with
a recordable offense, or if the person was informed that he or she
would be reported for such an offense. 49 Thus, the CJPOA expanded
the scope of data that police could collect for the NDNAD to include
intimate samples (e.g., blood or other similar samples from which
police can collect DNA) and also expanded the scope of suspects from
whom police could take samples to include those charged with any
"recordable offense."50
PACE also originally indicated that the government would not
maintain an individual's profile in the database unless the arrest
resulted in a conviction.51 However, administrative problems led to
cases in which DNA samples were not expunged but instead were
used to identify suspects. 52 In order to take advantage of the
database's ability to help identify suspects without criminal records,
the House of Lords expanded the law in 2001 to permit indefinite
retention of samples from individuals who were arrested, even if the
arrest did not ultimately result in a conviction. 53
Under PACE, suspects received a number of protections to
govern their dealings with police, including requirements that police
document all traffic stops and tape record interviews at police
stations. 54 Furthermore, PACE established that police must have
reasonable grounds to suspect that they will find a stolen or
prohibited article prior to searching a person or a vehicle in a public

1995) (describing the legal foundation of the DNA database and providing guidance on
its operational use).
45.
ASPLEN, supranote 39, at 3-4.
PACE was introduced in the United Kingdom in an effort to inform and
46.
guide police powers to stop and search, and to arrest. DAVIES ET AL., supra note 16, at
101-05.
47.
ASPLEN, supra note 39, at 5.
See id. at 5-6 (discussing the classification of intimate and non-intimate
48.
samples and the limitations in place on the collection of the former).
Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 61 (Eng.).
49.
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 54 (Eng.); ASPLEN,
50.
supranote 39, at 5.
Police and Criminal Evidence Act § 64; ASPLEN, supranote 39, at 5.
51.
52.
ASPLEN, supra note 39, at 6.
Criminal Justice and Police Act, 2001, c. 16, § 82 (Eng.); ASPLEN, supra
53.
note 39, at 6; see also LAURIE, supra note 44, at 91-92 (discussing public support for
expanding DNA retention under the Criminal Justice and Police Act of 2001).
54.
DAVIES ET AL., supranote 16, at 101.
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place. 55 The concept of reasonable grounds also extended to arrests,
and §§ 24-33 of PACE authorized police to "arrest anyone who is, or
whom they reasonably suspect to be, committing an arrestable
offence, and anyone who has committed or who can reasonably be
suspected of having committed an arrestable offence." 56
In 2006, the Association of Chief Police Officers in England and
Wales issued Retention Guidelines for Nominal Records on the Police
National Computer (Retention Guidelines) to provide guidance
regarding the varying degrees of access to fingerprint and DNA
records. The Retention Guidelines distinguished between police and
non-police agencies who share data with them, and access depended
on a number of factors, including time elapsed since conviction, the
seriousness of the offense, and the age of the suspect.57 Data
regarding individuals who were not convicted of an offense were not
accessible to the non-police agencies.5 8 Furthermore, when individual
police officers requested a search be carried out in conjunction with
DNA from a crime scene, they received only information about
profiles that match the DNA sample and did not have access to the
database itself.59
In November 2008, the House of Lords approved an amendment
to the Counter Terrorism Bill that established a process assisting
innocent people in removing their DNA and fingerprints from the
Baroness Hanham, who proposed the
national database.6 0
amendment, stated: "There is no transparency in the current
situation and the dice are severely loaded against innocent people
being able to ensure that their most personal details are not kept
indefinitely following their exclusion .... ."61 The Council of Europe
has also provided a number of recommendations in effect in the
United Kingdom that provide guidance for the use of personal data,

Id.
55.
Id. at 103.
56.
57.
AsS'N OF CHIEF POLICE OFFICERS, RETENTION GUIDELINES FOR NOMINAL
1.5-1.6
(2006),
COMPUTER
NATIONAL
THE
POLICE
RECORDS
ON
http://www.acpo.police.uk/documents/PoliceCertificates/SubjectAccess/Retention%20of
%20RecordsO6.pdf; see also S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1581,
TT 33-34 (discussing the Retention Guidelines and noting that they "are based on a
format of restricting access to the Police National Computer (PNC) data, rather than
the deletion of that data").
Marper, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. T 34.
58.
59.
HOME OFFICE, KEEPING THE RIGHT PEOPLE ON THE DNA DATABASE:
SCIENCE AND PUBLIC PROTECTION, TT 4.8-4.9 (2009), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/
documents/cons-2009-dna-database/dna-consultation?view=Binary [hereinafter HOME
OFFICE CONSULTATION].
Lords Votes in Favour of DNA-Deletion Process, ZDNet UK (Nov. 6, 2008),
60.
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/security/0, 1000000189,39543009,00.htm.
Id.
61.

f
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including DNA samples. 62 . The Council,

73

in the "Explanatory

Memorandum to Recommendation No. R(92)1 .

.

. [on] [t]he use of

analysis of [DNA] within the framework of the criminal justice
system," noted that "[s]ince the primary aim of the collection of
samples and the carrying out of DNA analysis on such samples is the
identification of offenders and the exoneration of suspected persons,
the data should be deleted once persons have been cleared of
suspicion."63 Of the at least twenty Council of Europe member states
that allow DNA information to be taken and stored, the United
Kingdom was the only one to expressly permit the systematic and
indefinite retention of DNA samples and profiles of individuals who
were acquitted or against whom charges had been dropped.64
The provisions that governed DNA retention in England and
Wales were the same as those in force in Northern Ireland, but
continued to be more permissive than those of other European
countries. 6 5 In Scotland, for example, the 1995 Criminal Procedure
Act of Scotland establishes specific requirements for when officials
must destroy samples and the resulting profiles:
[T]he DNA samples and. resulting profiles must be destroyed if the
individual is not convicted or is granted an absolute discharge. A
recent qualification provides that biological samples and profiles may
be retained for three years, if the arrestee is suspected of certain sexual
or violent offences even if a person is not convicted (section 83 of the
2006 Act, adding section 18A to the 1995 Act.). Thereafter, samples
and information are required to be destroyed unless a Chief Constable
66
applies to a Sheriff for a two-year extension.

This statute caused some to question whether England and Wales
should formulate more restrictive policies, and the European Court of
Human Rights ultimately decided a case that addressed DNA
retention policies.

62.
See Marper, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. TT 41-44 (describing Council of Europe
texts); see also, e.g., Recommendation No. R (92) 1 of the Committee of Ministers of
Member States on the Use of Analysis of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Within the
Framework of the Criminal Justice System, at 1 (Feb. 10, 1992), available at
https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlob
(recommending
Get&InstranetImage=1518265&SecMode=1&DocId=601410&Usage=2
how DNA samples should be used by law enforcement in member and non-member
countries).
Explanatory Memorandum to Recommendation No. R (92) 1 of the
63.
Committee of Minsters to Member States on the Use of Analysis of DeoxyribonucleicAcid
49 (Feb. 10, 1992),
(DNA) Within the Framework of the Criminal Justice System,
available at https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/ViewDoc.jsp?id=611937&Site=CM.
64.
Marper, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11 45-47.
65.
Id. T 37.
66.
Id. T 36.
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The S. & Marper v. the United Kingdom Decision

On December 4, 2008, the European Court of Human Rights
unanimously decided the case of S. & Marper v. the United
Kingdom.6 7 In that case, the Grand Chamber determined that
retaining DNA samples from two individuals who were arrested but
not convicted constituted a violation of their privacy rights. 68 The
court in Marperraised a number of concerns about broad retention of
DNA samples. 69 It concluded that "the retention of both cellular
samples and DNA profiles discloses an interference with the
applicants' right to respect for their private lives, within the meaning
of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention [for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms]."70 The court ultimately determined
that England's indefinite retention policy violated Article 8 of the
Convention because it interfered with the applicants' "right to respect
for private life" more than was necessary.71
3.

Responses to Marper: Changing Approaches to DNA Retention

In response to the Marper decision, the United Kingdom Home
Office 72 released a paper, the Home Office Consultation, containing
proposed changes and seeking comment from the public.7 3 The
objective was to "develop a DNA framework which has the support
and confidence of the public and achieves a proportionate balance
between the rights of the individual and protection of the public." 74
In the Home Office Consultation, the government analyzed data
regarding recidivism, rearrest, and reconviction in both the United
States and the United Kingdom to determine the optimal timeframe
for retention.75 In coming to their final conclusions, the Home Office
primarily relied upon a report from the Jill Dando Institute,7 6 which
provided data regarding the rates at which arrestees reoffend in

Id.
67.
68.
Id. 1 125.
Id. IT 122-24.
69.
Id. 1 77.
70.
Id. 1 125.
71.
72.
The Home Office is the government department responsible for policy and
criminal
matters
in the
United Kingdom.
About
Us, HOME OFF.,
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uklabout-us (last visited Mar. 24, 2011).
73.
HOME OFFICE CONSULTATION, supranote 59, IT 1.1-1.3.
74.
Id. 1 1.3.
6.5-6.13 (discussing findings related to recidivism and
75.
See id.
reasonable retention periods).
76.
The University London College Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science is a
department devoted to reducing crime through research and policy analysis. About the
UCL Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, UCL JILL DANDO INST. OF CRIME SC.,
http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/about/jdilindex.php (last visited Mar. 24, 2011).
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comparison with the general population and individuals who are
convicted."7 The report provided an important resource upon which
the Home Office based its recommendations for determining the
appropriate retention periods for DNA samples.7 8 Ultimately, the
Home Office distinguished between retention of DNA samples and
retention of DNA profiles.7 9 Due to the greater amount of sensitive
and personal information that can be obtained from DNA samples,
the Home Office proposed retaining them for no longer than six
months.80
Although its efforts are admirable, the Home Office still appears
to be struggling to obtain full public support for its policies.81 Some
officials, on the other hand, argue that the proposals are adequate,
but that they will lead to a reduction in crime solving. 82 Ultimately,
the goal must be to balance the privacy interests of individuals, who
should be considered innocent until proven guilty, against the need to
solve crimes and prevent future offenses.8 3 Although England and
Wales were at the forefront of DNA collection, the practice has grown
increasingly common in the United States, with many of the same
issues beginning to emerge. 84

C. The United States and Forensic Science Legislation
1.

History of DNA in the United States

Although DNA-based genetic profiling in a criminal investigation
was first used successfully by Alec Jeffreys in the United Kingdom in
1987,85 debate exists over when DNA evidence was first utilized in

2.8, 6.5 (presenting
See HOME OFFICE CONSULTATION, supra note 59,
77.
research by the Jill Dando Institute regarding the risk of reoffending).
See id. (noting the report's reliance on the data from the Jill Dando
78.
Institute to select retention periods).
79.
Id. 1 5.1-5.2.
HOME OFFICE, KEEPING THE RIGHT PEOPLE ON THE DNA DATABASE:
80.
SCIENCE AND PUBLIC PROTECTION: SUMMARY OF RESPONSES, PUBLIC CONSULTATION 7

May - 7 August 2009 12 (2009), http://www.parliament.uk/deposits/depositedpapers/
2009/DEP2009-2788.pdf [hereinafter Home Office Response].
81.
See, e.g., Time Limits on Innocent DNA Data, BBC NEWS, May 7, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiluk/8037042.stm (discussing how rights groups believe the
proposals do not adequately address the concerns raised by the Marper decision).
See id. ("One official estimate suggests there will be 4,500 fewer offences
82.
detected on average each year. . . .").
See supra Part III.C (discussing the risks of indefinite retention policies).
83.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 943.325 (West 2010) (permitting the collection of
84.
DNA samples from arrestees and imposing a burdensome procedure for the removal of
such information).
See Bieber, supra note 13, at 27 (discussing the history of forensic profiling
85.
for individual identification). Jeffreys, a professor at the University of Leicester,
compared DNA profiles prepared from evidence collected at two different crime scenes
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the United States.8 6 There is, however, generally a consensus that
DNA evidence became increasingly visible in the United States in the
late 1980s in conjunction with three cases.8 7 The first case was a
November 6, 1987 conviction in Florida of an individual with evidence
from a DNA test.88 The second case, tried in New York in 1987, was
one of the first in which DNA forensics was legitimized as
scientifically valid upon appeal.8 9 The third case occurred in Virginia
in response to a series of murders that took place between 1983 and
1987, and the perpetrator became the first individual put to death
primarily as a result of DNA evidence.9 0 Since these cases, scientists
have made numerous advances in the use of DNA to both exonerate
and convict individuals accused of crimes. 9 1
As police reliance on DNA analysis increased, Congress passed
the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, authorizing
federal law enforcement officials to collect DNA samples from federal
offenders convicted of qualifying offenses. 9 2 According to Congress,
the Act provided legal authority for mandatory and discretionary
collection of DNA from federal offenders, and it aimed to improve the
effectiveness of DNA processing through a grant program.93 The
grant program allocated federal funds in order to deal with a backlog
in processing caused by deficiencies in resources at the state and local
levels and established the need to carry out DNA testing in a timely
manner.94 In 2001, additional qualifying offenses were added under §

to the DNA of a false confessor and to DNA collected from adult males living in the
area of the crime. Id.
See, e.g., id. ("[Plerhaps the first forensic use of polymerase chain reaction
86.
(PCR)-based DNA typing was to assist a Pennsylvania court in a 1986 case
[Commonwealth v. Pestinikas] in determination of whether two autopsy samples were
derived from the same person.").
LINDA L. MCCABE & EDWARD R.B. McCABE, DNA: PROMISE AND PERIL 11787.
18 (2008).
Id. In this case, Tommie Lee Andrews was ultimately convicted of rape
88.
after the DNA from his blood sample matched the DNA in the semen recovered from
the victim. Id.
Id. at 118.
89.
Id. at 118-19.
90.
See, e.g., David Lazer, Introduction to DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
91.
SYSTEM, supra note 13, at i, iv-vii (describing cases in which DNA evidence was used
for the purposes of exoneration and conviction).
92.
See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546,
§§ 1-3, 114 Stat. 2726, 2726-31 (2000) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14135)
(setting out the purpose of the Act and describing the grant distribution program); see
also Regulations Under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act, 66 Fed. Reg.
34,362 (proposed June 28, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28) (specifying the
qualifying offenses and the responsibilities of the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the
FBI under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act).
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 §§ 1-3.
93.
Id.
94.
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503 of the USA PATRIOT Act.95 DNA collection was further
expanded pursuant to § 203(b) of the Justice for All Act of 2004,
which allowed for collection of samples from all convicted felons. 96
Perhaps the largest expansion of DNA collection authority came in
2005. Pursuant to the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, federal officers
now have the authority to immediately take DNA from any arrestee
or detained non-citizen and upload it to the FBI's Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS) database.97 Once collected, the DNA sample
itself is stored in local databases, and DNA profiles are entered into
CODIS.98
The FBI established CODIS in 1990 as a pilot program and
formalized it in 1994.99 CODIS contains two sets of searchable
information: DNA profiles of convicted individuals (the Convicted
Offender Index) and profiles generated from DNA collected at crime
scenes (the Forensic Index).1 00 In addition to DNA profiles, CODIS
also stores information to identify the source of the DNA and the
laboratory at which it was analyzed.'10 Furthermore, all fifty states
have passed laws creating similar, state-run DNA databases. 0 2
Through CODIS, federal, state, and local crime laboratories can
exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically. 0 3 This allows
law enforcement to identify criminals who commit crimes across state
95.
USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 503, 115 Stat. 272, 364 (2001);
see also Regulations Under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 68 Fed.
Reg. 74,855 (Dec. 29, 2003) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 28) (providing the
Department of Justice's publication of a final rule implementing the qualifying offenses
provided under the USA PATRIOT Act). The additional qualifying offenses include the
attempt, commission, or conspiracy to commit crimes of violence, as defined in § 16, or
federal crimes of terrorism, as defined by § 2332b(g)(5)(B) of Title 18 of the United
States Code. Regulations Under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 68
Fed. Reg. at 74,855-57.
96.
Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, § 203(b), 118 Stat. 2260,
2270 (2004); see also DNA Sample Collection from Federal Offenders Under the Justice
for All Act of 2004, 70 Fed. Reg. 4763 (proposed Jan. 31, 2005) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. pt. 28) (providing the Department of Justice's implementation of the Act's
authority under an interim final rule).
97.
Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, § 1004, 119 Stat. 2960, 3085 (2005); see also Ryan Singel,
Feds to Collect Millions of DNA Profiles Yearly, Stay Out If You Can, WIRED (May 12,
2008, 5:15 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/05/feds-to-collect ("Thanks to
an amendment in the Violence Against Women Act of 2005 . .. the feds now have the
authority to immediately take DNA from any arrestee or 'detained' non-citizen and
immediately upload it to the FBI's CODIS database.").
See 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2006) (giving the director of the FBI authority to
98.
create a DNA database).
99.
Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, The Expanding Use of DNA in
Law Enforcement: What Role for Privacy,34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 153, 154 (2006).
100.
KOBILINSKY ET AL., supranote 2, at 164.
101.
Id.
102.
Lazer, supra note 91, at xi.
103.
KOBILINSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 164-65; Rothstein & Talbott, supra
note 99, at 154.
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lines. 104 Moreover, CODIS is compatible with databases in Europe
and South America, making it possible for law enforcement to track
and catch criminals even if they commit crimes in different parts of
the world.' 0 5
As of 2010, twenty-four states had enacted legislation to require
DNA collection from certain felony arrestees, and twelve states and
the federal government allowed DNA samples to be collected from all
felony arrestees. 106 Of these states, only eight provide for automatic
expungement of DNA samples, while seventeen will remove DNA
information from the database upon request and, in some cases, at
the discretion of law enforcement. 0 7 At the federal level, DNA is not
expunged unless the arrestee submits a request and provides a
certified copy of a final court order, signed by a judge, establishing
that the charge was dismissed, resulted in an acquittal, or that no
08
charge was filed within the applicable time period.
The U.S. military also conducts DNA collection as part of its
routine practices and requires all uniformed personnel to provide
reference blood samples, either when they enter the military or prior
09
Although the
to deployment, from which DNA can be extracted.
110
intended purpose of these samples is to identify human remains,
Department of Defense regulations have also always allowed the
DNA to be used in conjunction with evidence collected at a crime
scene. 111
Another avenue of DNA collection occurs at the local level, and
these DNA samples are often not subject to the same oversight as
state and federal databases. For example, the district attorney in
Orange County, California has begun offering incentives, including
the possibility of charges being dropped, to arrestees to obtain DNA

KOBILINSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 164-65.
104.
Id. at 163.
105.
State DNA Database Laws Qualifying Offenses, DNAResource.com,
106.
http://www.dnaresource.comldocuments/statequalifyingoffenses2010.pdf (last visited
Mar. 24, 2011) (charting state DNA database laws as of September 2010); State Laws
for Arrestee DNA Databases, DNARESOURCE.COM, http://www.dnaresource.com/
documents/ArresteeDNALaws-2010.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2011); see also, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 943.325 (West 2010) (mandating DNA sample collection from all felony
arrestees).
107.
State Laws for Arrestee DNA Databases, supra note 106. In Minnesota,
DNA samples are automatically expunged upon a finding of not guilty, or at the
request of the individual if the charges were dismissed or dropped. Id.
CODIS-Expungement Policy, FBI-FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
108.
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis/codis-expungement (last visited Mar. 24, 2011);
State Laws for Arrestee DNA Databases,supra note 106.
Bieber, supranote 13, at 43.
109.
110.
Id.
See id. at 44 (noting that Department of Defense regulations allow access to
111.
blood samples for DNA profiling during criminal investigations).
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samples and expand the county's DNA database.11 2 Critics are
concerned that the district attorney's plan targets individuals
arrested for nonviolent misdemeanors,113 a category of arrestees that
previously had not been required to provide DNA samples under any
state or federal legislation. The DNA samples collected in Orange
County are maintained in a local database and are not run by an
accredited crime lab.11 4 Critics call these types of local databases
"rogues" because they are not subject to state and federal guidelines
and thus lack the same safeguards against misuse of the DNA
profiles." 5
There are now a variety of circumstances under which an
individual suspected of a crime may be asked or forced to provide a
That sample may then find its way onto DNA
DNA sample.
databases at the federal and local levels. The increasing number of
cases relying on DNA evidence has thus forced courts to address
circumstances in which it is appropriate not only to collect DNA
samples from a suspect but to introduce the resulting profiles as
evidence.
2.

Judicial Decision-Making Regarding DNA

Courts have held that, even where a DNA profile has not been
matched to a specific individual, it can be used to identify a suspect
on an arrest warrant for purposes of fulfilling the "reasonable
certainty" identification requirements. However, once DNA has been
collected, processed, and used to identify a suspect, many factors can
affect how and when prosecutors can introduce the information into
evidence against a criminal defendant. Courts have established
standards for when scientific evidence is admissible and can be
presented to a jury. In Frye v. United States,116 the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals was the first to elucidate a standard for
the admission of scientific evidence.11 7 Under the Frye standard,
evidence must be "generally accepted" in the pertinent scientific
Although some states
community to be admissible in court."18

112.
See Tami Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.? A DNA Sample Could Buy Freedom,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2009, at Al (noting that, in some cases, charges may not even be
filed if the arrested person agrees to provide a DNA sample).
Id.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
116.
Id.; see also KOBILINSKI ET AL., supra note 2, at 198-200 (describing Frye
117.
and "the creation of a judicial gatekeeping function").
118.
Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
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continue to adhere to the Frye standard,11 9 the introduction of the
Federal Rules of Evidence 20 and the Supreme Court's decision in
1 2 ' further expanded the
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
discretion of judges to determine the admissibility of scientific
evidence. Under Daubert, courts must determine the admissibility of
scientific evidence by evaluating the validity of two aspects: whether
the evidence represents "scientific knowledge" and whether it is
relevant and supports what the evidence purports to show.1 22 In
determining whether evidence represents scientific knowledge, a
court may consider whether it is testable, if it has been described in
scientific publications subject to peer review, its reliability, and its
general acceptance in the relevant community.' 2 3 Although originally
limited to scientific evidence, in 1999, the Supreme Court extended
Daubert to apply to all expert testimony in which technical or
specialized material is presented. 2 4 In practice, DNA evidence is
usually found admissible under these standards, but issues may arise
because of improper chain of custody practices or contamination.125
In addition to admissibility concerns, courts have also had to
grapple with whether DNA collection and retention is permissible
under the Constitution. Analysis of DNA collection laws in the
United States has focused on their constitutionality under the Fourth
Amendment. 126 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits have addressed the
question of whether the DNA Act is a valid exercise of congressional
27
power, and each determined that it is constitutionally permissible.

See KOBILINSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 206 ("The standards adopted by the
119.
individual states tend to be derivatives of one of the three federal standards .... The
majority use the Frye standard.").
See FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
120.
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."); see also KOBILINSKY
ET AL., supra note 2, at 201 (describing how Rule 403 expanded the gatekeeping
function of judges).
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592-96 (1993) (allowing
121.
judges to look beyond general acceptance and consider other factors in deciding
whether or not to admit expert testimony).
Id. at 592-94.
122.
Id. at 592-96.
123.
See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158 (1999) (concluding
124.
that the general holding of Daubert applies to technical and other specialized
knowledge such as the testimony of engineers, as well as to scientific knowledge).
KOBILINSKY ET AL., supranote 2, at 207-08.
125.
See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 (9th Cir. 2004)
126.
(finding that DNA collection cases implicate the Fourth Amendment because the
"compulsory extraction of blood ... constitutes a 'search' within the meaning of the
Constitution").
See id. at 839-40 (discussing the case of a convicted felon who refused to
127.
have his blood drawn as a condition of probation and upholding searches pursuant to
the DNA Act as constitutional); United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873, 877 (10th Cir.
2003) (finding that the DNA Act was a 'legitimate exercise of congressional power
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Additionally, a number of states have ruled on Fourth Amendment
challenges to local statutes, and the majority have treated DNA
collection as something akin to fingerprinting, a practice that courts
have long accepted. 128 Conversely, a Minnesota appellate court ruled
that a statute requiring officers to obtain a sample of DNA from
arrestees was unconstitutional because a person who is merely
charged with a crime has a greater expectation of privacy than
someone who was convicted.129 This demonstrates that some courts
will indeed be willing to rule against DNA collection practices,
particularly when it seems improbable that taking the DNA sample
will produce evidence of a crime.13 0

D. Alternative DNA Collection Practices
Although the largest DNA databases are run by the United
Kingdom and the United States, a number of other countries utilize
DNA forensics as a crime-solving tool. Many of these countries have
implemented more restrictive DNA collection practices that can serve
as a model for the United States and the United Kingdom.
Furthermore, countries are becoming increasingly capable of sharing
DNA profile information, so it is important to understand what
information might be available from these various databases.
In New Zealand, the use of DNA profiling in two high-profile sex
offender cases in the early 1990s prompted the creation of a DNA
database.13 1 In 1995, the New Zealand police began collaborating
with the Institute of Environmental Science and Research, Ltd., and
the legislature established the New Zealand DNA Databank in
August 1996.132 The Criminal Investigations (Blood Samples) Act of
1995 establishes stringent standards under which police can collect

under the Necessary and Proper Clause"); see also United States v. Reynard, 473 F.3d
1008, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the DNA Act did not go beyond Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause or the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination).

128.
See, e.g., United States v. Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d 903, 906 (E.D. Cal. 2009)
(upholding the constitutionality of DNA sample collection from individuals arrested for
felonies in California, when the DNA is to be used solely for "criminal law enforcement,
identification purposes"); Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va. 2007)
(holding that the taking of an individual's DNA upon arrest is "no different in
character than acquiring fingerprints upon arrest" and does not constitute an unlawful
search under the Fourth Amendment).
129.
In re C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
See id. (holding that an individual who has not been convicted maintains a
130.
reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus the Fourth Amendment is violated when a
biological specimen is taken from such a person, unless "there is a fair probability that
the search will produce contraband or evidence of a crime").
SA Harbison et al., The New Zealand DNA Databank:Its Development and
131.
Significance as a Crime Solving Tool, 41 Sc. & JUST. 33, 34 (2001).
132.
Id. at 33-34.
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blood samples for inclusion in the databank.1 33 Under the Act,
suspects may voluntarily provide a sample or, in certain situations,
the High Court may compel them to do so for comparison to a
particular case. 134 Additionally, all individuals who are convicted of
an indictable offense must provide a sample for the databank. 3 5 The
Act also specifically mandates that individuals who voluntarily
provide a sample for inclusion on the databank may choose to have
the DNA profile removed at any time. 136 When drafting the Act, New
Zealand took into consideration individual rights, the rights of police
to obtain samples, and the potential for misuse of data.1 3 7 As a
result, some might consider its potential more limited in scope that
the United Kingdom's program. Despite this limitation, New Zealand
has had a great deal of success with the databank, which contains
The databank has been
over 13,000 individual profiles.' 3 8
particularly helpful with identifying suspects in unsolved burglary
cases,139 and it continues to develop as law enforcement and
legislators gain experience while maintaining the databank's original
objectives and aims. 140
In Canada, a National DNA Data Bank was officially established
in 2000.141 In 2005, Canada further expanded the data bank to allow
for the inclusion of DNA profiles from "all persons convicted before
June 30, 2000 of murder, manslaughter or a sexual offence."142 Like
New Zealand, Canada's data bank does not include profiles from
arrestees.1 43 Additionally, in most cases, courts must authorize the
collection of DNA from convicted individuals.144 However, a court
may decline to authorize the collection if it determines that "a DNA
order would adversely affect the individual's privacy and security
interests in a manner that is grossly disproportionate to the public
interest."145 For example, in R. v. R.C., a juvenile stabbed his mother
in the foot with a pen after she dumped dirty laundry on him; the

133.
Id. at 34.
Id.
134.
135.
Id.
Id.
136.
Id.
137.
138.
Id. at 35.
See id. at 36 ("Of the total number of reported 'hits' 77% have originated
139.
from burglaries.").
Id. at 37.
140.
DNA Data Bank, PUB. SAFETY CAN., http://www.publicsafety.ge.ca/prg/cor/
141.
tls/dna-eng.aspx (last visited Mar. 24, 2011).
142.
Id.
143.
Id.
See R. v. R.C., [2005] 3 S.C.R. 99, para. 19 (Can.) (noting that §
144.
487.051(1)(a) of the Criminal Code requires a court to authorize the taking of DNA
samples from a person convicted of a primary designated offense unless certain
conditions are met).
Id. para. 21.
145.
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juvenile pled guilty to assault with a weapon.1 46 In considering
whether it was appropriate to authorize the taking of a DNA sample,
the trial judge balanced the objectives of DNA retention against the
principles and objectives of the youth criminal justice legislation.147
The trial judge ultimately refused to issue an order to authorize the
DNA collection, and the appellate court affirmed his decision.148 This
policy demonstrates a scheme in which it is feasible and appropriate
to give increased discretion to trial courts regarding DNA collection
and retention decisions.
On a broader scale, Interpol has recognized the increasing
usefulness of DNA databases and established a system known as the
DNA Gateway, through which police in member countries can submit
DNA profiles from offenders, crime scenes, missing persons, and
unidentified bodies to Interpol's automated DNA database.149 At the
same time, the protocol states that member countries retain
ownership over the DNA profiles and over other countries' access to
the data. 5 0 The national laws of individual countries continue to
govern the destruction of DNA profiles submitted to the Gateway.15
The DNA Gateway has been very successful; in its first six years of
operation, more than 100,000 DNA profiles were contributed by fiftyfive member countries and in 2009, searches of the database by
member countries led to seventy-four international hits.1 52 This adds
another level of consideration regarding DNA collection policies, as
arrestees whose DNA is retained in a database can now potentially be
implicated in cases at an international level.

III. ANALYSIS
DNA is admittedly a powerful tool in solving crimes that might
In September 2005, Sally Anne
otherwise remain unsolved. 53
Bowman's body was discovered in South London following her brutal
Although the killer was not
sexual assault and murder.154

146.
Id. para. 1.
See id. para. 33 (explaining that the court must strike a balance between
147.
youth criminal justice legislation and other DNA order provisions of the law).
148.
Id. paras. 11-14.
INTERPOL, COM/FS/2010-09/FS-01, DNA PROFILING 1, http://www.interpol.int/
149.
PubliclJCPO/FactSheets/FSOl.pdf.
150.
Id.
151.
Id.

152.

Id.

153.
See, e.g., Philippe Naughton, Britain Needs DNA Database, Says Officer
Who Headed Sally Anne Murder Inquiry, TIMES (London), Feb. 22, 2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tollnews/uk/crime/article3416427.ece (describing the case
of a woman whose killer was brought to justice by chance after his DNA was taken
nine months after the murder, following an arrest for a minor bar fight).
154.
Id.
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immediately apprehended, he was identified nine months later after
his DNA was taken following a "minor scuffle."15 5 Even the Sally
Anne Bowman case, however, lends only questionable support for
retaining the DNA of individuals who are arrested but not convicted
The killer in that case had a number of prior
of crimes.
convictions, 15 6 so even more restrictive legislation would likely have
allowed for his DNA to be retained on a database.
As discussed above, existing and potential legislation
surrounding DNA collection and retention can essentially be broken
down into the following four categories: (1) collection of DNA only
from individuals who are charged and convicted of crimes; (2) DNA
collection from arrestees with indefinite retention of DNA profiles on
a database; (3) DNA collection from arrestees with removal of DNA
profiles upon request; and (4) DNA collection from arrestees with
automatic expungement.
A. Privacy Concerns
The idea of privacy can encompass a number of different
interests, including the right to have control over personal
information about oneself, freedom from surveillance, freedom to
make personal decisions absent the influence of others, and the right
to exclude others from one's personal things and places. 157 The
benefits and dangers of DNA collection stem from the amount of
information it can reveal about individuals, including their
propensity for certain diseases and to whom they are related.15 8
Thus, experts raise concerns about who should control genetic
information, given that it can be used to reveal information about
relatives in addition to the individual from whom a sample was
taken.1 59 DNA molecules are like a medical record, but DNA
sequence profiles contain information that raises additional privacy
concerns. 160 One U.S. court that addressed whether constitutional
rights to privacy were implicated by genetic testing held that "the
right to privacy protects against the collection of information by illicit

Id.
155.
Id.
156.
See George J. Annas, Genetic Privacy, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
157.
SYSTEM, supra note 13, at 135, 136 (defining the concept of privacy).
158.
Id. at 137 ("DNA has the paradoxical quality of being unique to an
individual, yet shared with others."); Lazer, supra note 91, at 9 ("[DNA] may reveal
where you have been. It may reveal what you look like. It may reveal your propensity
for getting a particular disease. It reveals who you are related to and may reveal your
relatives' propensity for getting a particular disease.").
LAURIE, supra note 44, at 93.
159.
Annas, supra note 157, at 136.
160.
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means as well as unauthorized disclosures to third parties . . . ."i61
Given that DNA profiling is utilized around the world to study
diseases and for diagnostic testing in hospitals, 162 the system needs
adequate safeguards to protect against the use of DNA information
for unauthorized purposes.
The National DNA Database in the United Kingdom was used
for research without the consent of the individuals involved. 163 It is
unacceptable to carry out medical research on individuals without
their consent, and even criminals do not relinquish their right to
consent to having medical research conducted on them merely
because they were convicted of a crime. 164 Another case that raised
particular controversy in the United Kingdom was the retention of a
DNA sample collected from an infant on a national police database.165
The DNA sample was taken to eliminate the baby's DNA as a possible
match from crime scene evidence, but was not immediately removed
after this use and was thus accessible during later law enforcement
searches.166 Similarly, in the United States, the director of the Texas
Civil Rights Project discovered that newborn blood samples taken for
medical purposes were sent to the military for potential use in a
This action raises
database for law enforcement purposes.167
concerns about law enforcement capitalizing on DNA collected from
individuals who have clearly committed no crimes to expand a
criminal DNA database. As one critic has noted, "If the government
wants a universal DNA database it should say so, not smuggle one in
through the backdoor." 168
Law enforcement can similarly capitalize on this backdoor
strategy through the ability of DNA to provide information about not
just an individual, but also about his or her family members.
Although using DNA to identify kin has primarily been used in mass

161.
Id. at 138 (citing Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d
1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998)).
See, e.g., Bieber, supra note 13, at 42 (discussing the DNA Sciences Gene
162.
Trust Project, which registers thousands of participants in the United States to identify
the links between genes and common diseases).
163.
Mairi Levitt, The National DNA Database: Why No Public Debate?, in 3
ETHICS, LAW, AND SOCIETY 215, 216 (Jennifer Gunning & Soren Holm eds., 2007)
(noting that the database also contained DNA profiles from children and innocent
individuals).
Id.
164.
Baby's DNA Was Held on Database, BBC NEWS, Mar. 9, 2009,
165.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2hiluknews/politics/7933753.stm.
Id.
166.
167.
Mary Ann Roser, Suit Possible Over Baby DNA Sent to Military Lab for
Tex.),
Feb.
22,
2010,
STATESMAN
(Austin,
National
Database,
http://www.statesman.com/news/texas-politics/suit-possible-over-baby-dna-sent-tomilitary-268714.html.
168.
Liberty Government Defeat on DNA Database, BBC NEWS, Nov. 5, 2008,
Shami
(quoting
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/uk-news/politics/7710310.stm
Chakrabarti).
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disaster and missing person identifications,169 DNA was also used in
cases in the United Kingdom' 70 and the United States171 to identify
relatives of potential suspects. State and federal statutes in the
United States do not specifically address the use of DNA databases to
identify family members, so the inclusion of the DNA of arrestees
may also lead to the "de facto inclusion" of kin through familial
searching procedures.1 72 One expert has cautioned that "DNA
patterns from close relatives . . . have a greater chance of matching

than do those from randomly selected, unrelated individuals, and this
is often important to consider in statistical analyses of DNA testing
results."i73 Another risk of these types of searches lies in the fact
that, although identical twins have different fingerprints, they have
identical genomes.1 74 Thus, an individual with an identical twin may
be erroneously implicated in a crime merely because the individual's
sibling had previously been arrested.' 7 5 Notably, tests carried out on
behalf of the California police authorities showed that the
misidentification of two people having the same DNA profile was as
high as one in ten thousand.? 6 Such findings demonstrate that
despite the advancements that have been made, DNA technology is
not infallible.
B. Innocent Until Proven Guilty
The criminal justice systems of both the United Kingdom and the
United States are based upon the presumption that individuals are
innocent until proven guilty.' 7 7 As a result, the Marper court was
particularly concerned with the fact that it "was an entirely improper
and prejudicial differentiation to retain materials of persons who

Frederick R. Bieber et al., Finding Criminals Through DNA of Their
169.
Relatives, SCIENCE, June 2, 2006, at 1315, 1315.
170.
See id. (describing a Wales case where "[a] search of the U.K. National
DNA Database for individuals with a single specific rare allele found in the crime scene
evidence ... identified a 14-year old boy with a similar overall DNA profile[, which] led
police to his paternal uncle, Jeffrey Gafoor").
171.
See id. (describing a 1984 murder case where the police located their
suspect by matching DNA found on the scene to DNA of his brother, found on the
North Carolina DNA offender database).
See id. at 1316 (noting that the ability to conduct familial searches creates
172.
"a new category of people [who] effectively would be placed under lifetime genetic
surveillance").
173.
Bieber, supra note 13, at 41.
174.
KOBILINSKY ET AL., supra note 2, at 6.
175.
See Bieber, supra note 13, at 41 ("[Rjoutine analysis of nuclear DNA
polymorphisms cannot distinguish between monozygotic twins (triplets, quadruplets,
and so on). Thus, a so-called DNA match, although inclusionary, is not necessarily
probative.").
176.
DAVIES ET AL., supra note 16, at 97.
177.
See infra Part III.B (discussing presumption of innocence policies in various
countries).

2011]

THE DOUBLE-HELIX DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD

767

should be presumed to be innocent."1 7 8 In the United Kingdom, the
majority of respondents to the Home Office's Consultation report
were against retaining samples of individuals who were arrested but
not charged or convicted.1 79 Additionally, the Marper court noted
that there is a "risk of stigmatization, stemming from the fact that
persons in the position of the applicants, who have not been convicted
of any offense and are entitled to the presumption of innocence, are
treated in the same way as convicted persons."1 80 Every person has a
right not only to be presumed innocent, but also to be absolved of any
suspicion regarding his or her innocence following acquittal. 8 1
This presumption of innocence is so important that it has been
codified by a number of countries.1 82 A prominent example can be
found in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of the Council of Europe, which states,
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
Local U.S.
innocent until proved guilty according to law."183
governments should take this into consideration when drafting their
own DNA retention policies, particularly given the value that U.S.
citizens place on their privacy and on the right to a presumption of
innocence. 184 Enacting more permissive legislation regarding the
retention of DNA from arrestees who are not convicted undermines
this right.
Furthermore, allowing retention of arrestees' DNA may influence
law enforcement to target individuals who they believe may commit
crimes in the future, but who are currently innocent. In the United
Kingdom, for example, at least one officer admitted that he was
targeting certain juveniles who had not yet been arrested as part of a

178.
S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1581, T 127.
179.
HOME OFFICE RESPONSE, supra note 80, T 2.1.
180.
Marper, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 122.
181.
See id. ("[The applicants'] perception that they are not being treated as
innocent is heightened by the fact that their data are retained indefinitely in the same
way as the data of convicted persons, while the data of those who have never been
suspected of an offense are required to be destroyed.").
182.
See, e.g., Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11(d) (U.K.) ("Any
person charged with an offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proven
guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal."); 1789 Declaration des droits de i'Homme et du citoyen [Declaration of the
Rights of Man and of the Citizen] art. 11. ("Everyone is supposed innocent until having
been declared guilty.").
183.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms of the Council of Europe, art. 6.2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
184.
See U.S. CONST. amends. IV-\VI, XIV (establishing a right to be free from
unreasonable government searches and seizures, a right to due process of law, and a
right to a speedy trial by jury in criminal cases, and making these rights applicable
against state and local governments); see also Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,
453 (1895) (establishing the presumption of innocence for individuals accused of
crimes).
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"long-term crime prevention strategy." 8 5 If police begin using DNA
databases in this way, then they are effectively making
determinations of guilt against individuals who have done nothing
wrong. 186 These practices become even more potentially hazardous
when considered in the context of DNA systems that retain profiles
from arrestees indefinitely or for extended periods of time.
C. The Implications of Indefinite Retention of DNA Profiles
Indefinite retention policies are the most vulnerable to attack
because they raise the greatest amount of concern, particularly when
DNA is collected from individuals who have not been convicted of any
crime. Most countries are opposed to indefinite retention, choosing to
remove DNA profiles after five to twenty years if an individual is
convicted, or immediately if the individual is acquitted or the charges
are dropped.' 8 7 Before the Marper decision, only England and Wales,
Austria, Finland, and Norway retained the DNA profiles of convicted
individuals indefinitely.' 8 8 Even England and Wales are now being
forced to cabin their polices by weighing the public benefit against
private intrusions.189

A removal upon request policy increases the likelihood that
individuals will be informed that they have the option to have their
DNA profiles removed from a database. One benefit of such a policy
is that it gives arrestees a forum for objecting to the retention of their
DNA. However, some critics have raised concerns over the reluctance
of law enforcement and other responsible authorities to respond to
Figures obtained under the Freedom of
removal requests.
Information Act showed that some police forces in England and Wales
granted 80 percent or more of removal requests, while other forces
did not remove the DNA profiles of any applicants, with an average
removal rate of 22 percent. 9 0 One individual who was arrested
following a misunderstanding with her husband and against whom
charges were never filed has been trying to have her DNA records

Police Target 'Innocent' Youths for Arrest in Bid to Increase DNA Samples on
185.
Database, MAIL ONLINE, June 4, 2009, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article1190785/Police-target-innocent-youths-arrest-bid-increase-DNA-samples-data base.html.
See id. (quoting a representative who commented that "[bluilding a
186.
catalogue of people they think will be prominent criminals in the future sounds like a
renegade justice system").
187.
GENEWATCH UK, THE POLICE NATIONAL DNA DATABASE: BALANCING
CRIME DETECTION, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PRIVACY 28 (2005), http://www.genewatch.org/
uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483clc3d49e4/NationalDNADatabase.pdf.
Id.
188.
See generally S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1581.
189.

190.

Andy Tighe, Innocent People Face DNA Database 'Shambles,' BBC NEWS,

Dec. 31, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil8434713.stm.
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removed from the database for over five years.1 91 Practices such as
this not only threaten the privacy interests of innocent individuals,
they also undermine public confidence in the police forces.1 92 Thus,
review policy is important to monitor removal requests and ensure
that requests are handled expediently and appropriately within the
guidelines.
Although judicial decisions in the United States have primarily
analyzed the constitutionality of collecting DNA,193 retention policies
should also be subject to critical analysis. A Florida statute, for
example, provides that individuals from whom DNA is collected upon
arrest can only have the sample and information destroyed if they
provide official documentation demonstrating that the charges were
dismissed or the conviction overturned.194 However, the burden
should instead be placed on the DNA collector to automatically
destroy samples from those individuals who are arrested and either
not charged or found not guilty.
Additionally, many state statutes appear to authorize indefinite
retention of DNA samples from convicted individuals.19 5 Particularly
in light of the Marper decision, states should provide more detailed
guidelines and limit the scope of the samples that are maintained in a
DNA database. Analysts and legislatures can use available statistics
to determine the types of crimes (e.g., sexual assaults) that are
typically committed by repeat offenders, and only in those situations
is it appropriate to permanently maintain DNA samples in the
database. Procedures should also be in place to allow convicted felons
to petition to have their DNA removed from the database after a
certain period of time.
While most statutes in the United States allow for overly broad
collection and retention of DNA samples, some states have
implemented more restrictive legislation in their collection practices.
The Virginia statute at issue in Anderson v. Commonwealth is
narrower than those in other states and only imposes the DNA
Additionally, a
sampling requirement for certain crimes.196
Minnesota court in In re C. T.L. held that a statute requiring officers
to obtain a sample of DNA from arrestees was unconstitutional

191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
See supra Part II.C.2 (summarizing judicial decisions in the United States
regarding DNA collection practices).
194.
FLA. STAT. § 943.325(16) (West 2010).
195.
See, e.g., id. (establishing guidelines for DNA retention in Florida).
196.
See Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Va. 2007) (providing
the text of the statute at issue that enumerates the crimes that would result in
collection of DNA from an arrested person).
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In re C. T.L.
because it violated the Fourth Amendment.19 7
demonstrates that limiting certain aspects of the federal DNA statute
is appropriate, particularly in the case of individuals who are
arrested but not convicted.19 8 Unlike more expansive views toward
DNA retention, these cases provide examples of courts that have
taken a more cautious approach to the use of DNA collection to
By doing this, courts and
identify and apprehend suspects.
legislators seem to acknowledge the need to balance the interest in
solving crimes with the interest in respecting individuals' privacy.
Despite these outliers, a trend exists toward broadening the use
of DNA databases at the local level. In Florida, for example, the
legislature recently passed a measure that will require arrested
individuals to provide DNA samples for inclusion in a statewide
database, even if they are never charged with an offense.i9 9 This
requirement will apply to all felony suspects within ten years. 200
This bill suggests that legislatures are becoming increasingly
concerned with crime control and less concerned with the privacy
implications of this type of legislation.
The final response published by the United Kingdom after the
Marper decision demonstrates its commitment to balancing the need
for a DNA database with the protection of individual rights.2 0 ' Under
this new system, law enforcement will remove the profiles of adults
arrested, but not charged or convicted of any recordable offense, after
six years. 202 While a step in the right direction, this proposed
solution does not necessarily satisfy immediate privacy concerns.
Some statistics indicate that recidivism among individuals convicted
of crimes generally occurs within fifteen years, 203 and alternate
studies have suggested that the risk of reoffending decreases
Thus, it seems
significantly after as little as two years. 204
unnecessary to retain profiles of individuals who have committed no
offense beyond the timeframe in which even those convicted of a
crime are considered at significantly less risk of reoffending. Experts
further noted that "[1]ong retention of DNA personal data has little to

In re C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 486 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that a
197.
statute requiring officers to obtain a sample of DNA from arrestees was
unconstitutional).
198.
Id. at 490.
FLA. STAT. § 943.325(3) (West 2010).
199.
200.
Id.
See generally HOME OFFICE RESPONSE, supra note 80 (addressing concerns
201.
regarding the privacy rights of individuals and the need for effective police
enforcement).
Id.
202.
203.
Id.
See DNA Retention "Justifications"Disproved by Statistics,TECH & L. BLOG
204.
(Nov. 27, 2009), http:/Iblog.tech-and-law.com/2009/11/dna-retention-disproved-bystatistics.html (discussing studies conducted by English privacy experts regarding
rates of reoffending).
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do with detecting ordinary crime."2 05 Additionally, a reduction in the
length of retention does not eliminate the incentive for police to arrest
individuals merely to obtain their DNA given the logic that getting a
profile in the system for six years is better than not getting it at all.
Although some advocates believe that maintaining DNA in a
universal database will have a deterrent effect on the commission of
future crimes, 206 at least one official in the United Kingdom has
expressed concern that the increased amount of personal, identifying
information being collected and retained also leads to a potential
increase in the risks of false matches and the potential for technical
or human error. 207 Consequently, "[tihere is a real risk that a
disproportionate number of innocent British citizens will be sucked
into foreign criminal investigations" 208 because they will be
incorrectly implicated in conjunction with a crime. Those in favor of
expanding DNA databases, however, argue that the benefits that can
be gained from using the information to both solve and prevent
crimes far outweigh the potential risks. For example, the City of
Chicago completed a study in 2005 that looked at the criminal
activities of eight individuals who committed a number of violent
crimes before finally being arrested.2 09 The study reportedly found
that police could potentially have prevented twenty-two murders,
thirty rapes, and an unspecified number of attempted rapes and
aggravated kidnappings if they had had access to the DNA profiles of
the eight offenders. 210
Continued expansion of both national and international
databases also raises concerns about creating a backlog in the
processing of data. Although the situation in the United States has
improved, a number of states have reported a backlog in samples
collected from crime scenes and offenders, 2 11 and there is a lack of
2 12
Some
resources to support the mandate to create DNA databases.
should
visitor
and
citizen
U.K.
every
have gone so far as to say that
be added to the national DNA database.2 13 However, given the

Id.
205.
See, e.g., DAVIES ET AL., supra note 16, at 97 (discussing how Britain's
206.
implementation of a DNA database "will not only assist crime investigation, but might
also be a deterrent in that a person listed might abstain from committing further
sexual crimes as the chances of being identified are increased").
ECHR Decided Against the UK DNA Database, EUROPEAN DIGITAL RTS.
207.
(Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.edri.org/edri-gram/number6.24/echr-marper-case-dna-uk.
208.
Id. (emphasis added).
209.

CITY OF CHI., CHICAGO'S STUDY ON PREVENTABLE CRIMES

1-2 (2005),

http://www.dnaresource.com/documents/ChicagoPreventableCrimes-Final.pdf.
210.

Id.

Cordner & Scarborough, supra note 21, at 107.
211.
See Lazer, supra note 91, at xi ("[R]esources have been slow to follow the
212.
mandate to create [DNA] databases.").
213.
All UK 'Must Be on DNA Database,' BBC NEWS, Sept. 5, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiluk/6979138.stm.

772

VANDERBILT/OURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 44:745

difficulties faced by labs in processing and storing DNA profiles, it
would be difficult for a country like the United States to attain such a
lofty goal successfully. Priority should be placed on ensuring that the
DNA of individuals actually convicted of crimes gets entered into the
necessary databases before time can be allocated to those arrested
but not convicted.
Expanding the population of individuals being included in a
database also increases the potential for simple human error to lead
to grave mistakes. 214 Although it reported that many of the mistakes
have been corrected, a study released by the U.K. Home Office in
August 2007 found approximately 550,000 files with wrongly
recorded or misspelled names. 2 15 Even more concerning is evidence
that the Home Office used falsified information to justify their DNA
retention policies on at least one occasion. 2 16 David Hanson, the
Home Office Minister, attributed the actions to an administrative
error,2 17 but even if this is the case, it is unacceptable that DNA
databases used to support convictions can be manipulated in such a
way as to provide inaccurate information.

IV. SOLUTION

While appearing to be the primary method for governing DNA
collection and retention, broad-sweeping legislation is an
inappropriate means of mandating DNA collection. Instead, states
and the federal government should establish more targeted and
specific standards that take into consideration, for example, the
policy goals of rehabilitating juvenile offenders, as opposed to merely
punishing them. In order to address the concerns raised by the
European Court of Human Rights in Marper and forestall similar
litigation in the United States, legislatures should look to the policies
of Scotland and Canada, which have placed an increased emphasis on
privacy interests. Under an automatic expungement policy, statutes
establish a time period after which officials must remove the DNA
profiles of arrestees. Furthermore, some categories of crimes should

214.
Cf. UK DNA Database Errors Raise Concerns, EUROPEAN DIGITAL RTS.
http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number5.23/uk-dna-database-error
5,
2007),
(Dec.
(quoting one investigator who cautioned "[g]overnment databases are not necessarily
100 per cent accurate ... . It is quite clear you can't trust the Government with your
personal information. They need to massively tighten up the way they deal with these
issues").
215.
Id.
216.
Tom Whitehead, Blunder on DNA Defence by Home Office, TELEGRAPH
(London), Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/
7215984/Blunder-on-DNA-defence-by-Home-Office.html.
217.
Id.
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result in DNA removal immediately upon a finding of not guilty or a
determination that charges will be dropped.
Research conducted by the Jill Dando Institute following the
Marper case showed that 52 percent of reoffending happens within six
years.2 18 The research also showed that "it takes 15 years before the risk of
offending is at the same level as that for the general population." 2 19 However, it
is inappropriate to characterize an arrest as an "offense" given the presumption
of innocence granted to defendants in the United States and the United
Kingdom. Although probable cause is needed for an arrest, that individual still
remains innocent until proven guilty. One criticism by the Marper court
was that "[i]n most of the specific examples provided by the
Government the successful prosecution had not been contingent on
the retention of the records and in certain others the successful
outcome could have been achieved through more limited retention in
time and scope." 220 As a result of these findings, it would be wholly
inappropriate to have policies that allow for indefinite retention of DNA
profiles. Even under the most generous perspective, the laws should be
amended to provide for automatic expungement by the fifteen-year mark, since
"[t]wo-thirds of re-offending happens within 12 years." 221 Furthermore,
for
immediately
there should be automatic expungement
misdemeanor arrests.
Access to DNA databases should be limited to prevent law
enforcement from utilizing familial search procedures to match DNA
profiles to crime scene evidence, unless an individual has consented
to such a search. While an individual who is arrested for a crime
arguably gives up certain rights that could justify collecting and
retaining DNA, there is no rationale for extending that to the family
members of arrestees. Similarly, individuals who voluntarily provide
DNA profiles for medical testing and babies who are automatically
screened at birth do not consent per se to inclusion in a criminal
database. Thus, any legislation enacted that establishes a database
containing DNA profiles from arrestees must contain safeguards to
protect DNA profiles from being used for purposes outside of the
scope of the consent given by such individuals.
Given the large number of member countries who may also have
access to Interpol's DNA Gateway, 222 U.S. policy should be drafted to
reflect an awareness of the fact that placing an individual's
information on a DNA database could subject them to international
investigation. Thus, given that arrestees are still considered innocent
under U.S. law, this information should not be among that shared

1

218.
219.

HOME OFFICE CONSULTATION, supranote 59,
Id.

2.7.

220.

S. & Marper v. United Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1581,

221.

HOME OFFICE CONSULTATION, supranote 59, $ 2.7.

88.

222.
See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text (discussing Interpol's DNA
Gateway which facilitates the sharing of DNA information between member countries).
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with other countries. Taking into consideration the European Court
of Human Rights's suggestions in Marper, courts or legislatures may
need to step in and place certain limitations on the trend in the
United States toward decreased privacy and increased retention of
DNA samples from an expanded population of individuals. Given the
expanded role of forensic DNA analysis in criminal cases both in the
United States and abroad, the next step seems to be the expansion of
global DNA databases. Law enforcement and experts have already
recognized the benefit of sharing information from DNA databases to
Sharing information internationally
facilitate crime solving.
given the involvement of actors at
for
abuse,
the
possibility
increases
locations. It becomes the
different
in
many
and
levels
different
many
that they do not grant
to
ensure
countries
individual
of
responsibility
of
innocent citizens who
data
personal
the
sensitive
access
to
others
manner.
in
this
used
data
their
have
did not consent to

V. CONCLUSION

The expanded use of DNA databases in criminal investigations
raises serious ethical and legal implications that must be reflected
both in the guidelines given to law enforcement and in the policies
that govern submission, removal, and retention of the information.
Any U.S. system that facilitates international DNA sharing should
address the concerns of the Marper court as well as incorporate
traditional U.S. notions of privacy and liberty interests.
When Alec Jeffreys first conceived the idea of using DNA
profiling to assist in criminal investigations, it is unlikely that he
perceived the rapid growth in forensic science that would follow.
Since that time, numerous countries have established DNA databases
to both implicate and exonerate suspects, and the United Kingdom
has taken the lead on exploring the potential for an enormous
database. Recognizing the potential for using DNA databases to solve
crimes and to prevent future crimes, England and Wales attempted to
greatly expand its DNA database by allowing for the collection and
indefinite retention of DNA profiles from arrestees. Since the 2008
ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, the United Kingdom
has been forced to reevaluate their expansive policies and the
implications of the Marper decision extending beyond an official
mandate to revise policy. The decision has generated increased
distrust among the public in the United Kingdom and has contributed
to the undermining of what was an admirable effort to reduce crime
and provide relief to families by utilizing DNA evidence to solve
previously unsolvable cases.
As federal and state legislation in the United States become
increasingly expansive, legislators and law enforcement need to be
reminded that just because they have the technology to do something
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does not mean they should do it. The Marper decision demonstrates
how abuse of DNA technologies can lead to both a public and a
judicial backlash. This Note proposes that the United States curb its
collection and retention of DNA samples from arrestees, particularly
in light of the presumption of innocence and the implications and
stigma that necessarily result from telling innocent individuals that
they have fewer rights because they have been arrested.
EricaSolange Deray*

J.D. Candidate 2011, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.A. 2006, Swarthmore
College. The author would like to thank the editors and staff of the Vanderbilt Journal
of TransnationalLaw, and all the friends who offered their advice and support along
the way.

48

